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Bugdin: Supreme Court of New York, New York County: People v. Diggins

SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
NEW YORK COUNTY
People v. Diggins'
(decided October 19, 2009)
Isaac Diggins "was convicted of criminal possession of a
weapon in the second degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the
third degree, and menacing in the second degree." 2 Subsequently,
Diggins moved to vacate the conviction pursuant to section
440.10(l)(h) of the New York Criminal Procedure Law, claiming that
his attorney's trial strategy violated his right to the effective
assistance of counsel. 3 Specifically, Diggins asserted that his right to
the effective assistance of counsel under the United States
Constitution4 and the New York Constitution5 was violated when his
attorney failed to participate in a Huntley hearing 6 and a jury trial
held in absentia.7 The New York Supreme Court held that Diggins
received the effective assistance of counsel despite this "strategy of

' No. 4637/03, 2009 WL 3461616 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 19, 2009).
2 Id. at *1.
3 Id.; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(l)(h) (McKinney 2009), states, in relevant part:
At any time after the entry of a judgment, the court in which it was
entered may, upon motion of the defendant, vacate such judgment upon
the ground that . .. (h) The judgment was obtained in violation of a right
of the defendant under the constitution of this state or of the United
States.
4 U.S. CONST. amend. VI, states, in relevant part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right . .. to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6, states, in relevant part: "In any trial in any court whatever the
party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel as in civil
actions and shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation and be confronted
with the witnesses against him or her."
6 See People v. Huntley, 204 N.E.2d 179, 183 (N.Y. 1965) (requiring that a "[j]udge must
find voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt before [a] confession can be submitted to [a]
trial jury").
Diggins, 2009 WL 3461616, at * 1. Diggins also claimed that this right was violated
when his attorney failed to file a notice of appeal following his convictions. Id.
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silence."8 In making this decision, the court focused on factors such
as counsel's experience in criminal matters, the weight of the
evidence against the defendant, the defendant's absence from the
hearing and trial, and counsel's "conscious, strategic decision" to
limit his participation and utilize a "strategy of silence."9
Additionally, the court found that Diggins failed to meet his "burden
of proving . . . every fact essential to support [his] motion[,]"'o and

that the conduct of the defendant's counsel did not prejudice the
outcome of his trial."
In the early morning of August 17, 2003, Mrs. Diggins and
her friend confronted the defendant, Isaac Diggins, after they caught
him with his mistress.' 2 Subsequently, he pointed a gun at his wife
and ordered her to back up.' 3 After being approached by his wife's
friend, Diggins put his gun away and fled the scene.14 Mrs. Diggins
reported the incident to the police and informed them that Diggins
could most likely be found at his mistress' apartment. 15
The police located the defendant at the apartment, recovered a
semi automatic handgun, and subsequently arrested him for criminal
possession of a weapon and menacing.16 Following his arrest,
Diggins made incriminating statements to the police in the hallway of
the apartment building and at the precinct, stating that he had an
argument with his wife earlier that day. 17
Diggins' attorney, Thomas Giovanni, was granted a Huntley
hearing to suppress the statements made by the defendant to the law
enforcement officials.'" However, the defendant failed to appear for
this hearing and the subsequent trial.' 9 Mr. Giovanni requested an
adjournment, arguing that Diggins' appearance was essential to his
defense.
On a number of occasions, Mr. Giovanni informed the
Id. at *8, 16.
0

Id at *7-8, 10, 12-13.
Id. at *14-15.
Diggins, 2009 WL 3461616, at *12.

12 Id. at *5.
3 Id.
14 id
15 Id

'6 Diggins, 2009 WL 3461616, at *6.
" Id at *1.
19 Id
20

Id at

*I1.

In requesting an adjournment, Mr. Giovanni told the court that the "case is
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court of his decision not to participate and explained the reasoning
behind this decision. 2 ' However, the court determined that "the
defendant had willfully and voluntarily absented himself' and
ordered that the Huntley hearing and trial proceed in absentia.22
After repeated requests for an adjournment were denied, the
court "proceeded to conduct the Huntley hearing in absentia." 23 At
the hearing, the police officer described the statements made by
Diggins in the hallway of the apartment building and at the
precinct.24 Following this testimony, "Mr. Giovanni did not conduct
any cross-examination of the [police] [o]fficer" or "make any
arguments as to why either of defendant's statements should be
suppressed." 25 Subsequently, the court denied the motion to suppress
Concluding the Huntley hearing, the court
the statements.26
scheduled jury selection for the following day. 27 At this time, Mr.
Giovanni expressed to the court that he felt he could not "ethically"
represent his client under the circumstances and, as a result, requested
to be withdrawn from the case; however, this application was
denied.28
At jury selection, Mr. Giovanni discussed his plan not to
participate in the trial, requested that the court advise the jury of his
decision, and reasoned that, without his client's presence, the best
defense strategy was not to participate. 29 Although Mr. Giovanni
agreed to participate in jury selection and the trial if it would be
advantageous to his client, he did not question any of the prospective
jurors or make any challenges.3 0

highly dependent on [Diggins'] help to defend himself' and that "he could not effectively
represent [the] defendant unless the defendant was present for the proceedings." Diggins,
2009 WL 3461616, at *1-2. Mr. Giovanni's reasoning was based primarily on the fact that
the case involved a domestic violence dispute. Id. at *2, 8.
21 Id. at *1-3. "At the outset of the proceedings . . . , there was additional and extensive
discussion relative to [] Mr. Giovanni's plan not to participate . . . ." Id at *3.
22 Idat*l.
23 Diggins, 2009 WL 3461616, at *2 (emphasis omitted).
24 id.
25

id.

26 id.
27 id.

Diggins, 2009 WL 3461616, at *2-3.
29 Id. at *3. Mr. Giovanni stated to the court that this was" 'the best way to try a case in
this situation.' " Id.
30 Id. at *3-4.
28
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At trial, Mr. Giovanni did not make an opening statement,
cross-examine any of the prosecution's witnesses, make any motions,
call any witnesses, interpose any objections, or make a closing
statement. 31 He did, however, request that the instructions to the
jurors regarding his nonparticipation be repeated and that the jury be
polled.32 Following a guilty verdict on all counts, sentencing
proceeded in absentia where Mr. Giovanni "made a variety of
arguments in support of his request that the Court sentence [Diggins]
to the minimum term authorized by law." 33 Despite Mr. Giovanni's
arguments, Diggins was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment.3 4
Diggins sought to vacate his conviction, asserting that Mr.
Giovanni's "strategy of silence" during the Huntley hearing and the
trial was equivalent to the ineffective assistance of counsel in
At the motion
violation of the Federal and State Constitutions.3
hearing, Mr. Giovanni, the only witness called, testified about his
experience as a criminal defense attorney, his preparation of the case
for trial, including "preparing motions, meeting with the defendants
and engaging the services of an investigator," and his unsuccessful
attempts to locate the defendant.3 6 Mr. Giovanni stated that, at the
time he represented Diggins, he "had been a staff attorney with [the
Neighborhood Defender Services of Harlem] since 2001, and had
done all aspects of criminal defense work, including felony and
misdemeanor trials."3 7 Furthermore, at the time the motion hearing
was conducted, Mr. Giovanni was a supervising attorney with the
Neighborhood Defender Services of Harlem. 8 Before making his
"strategic" decision to remain silent during the trial, Mr. Giovanni
discussed the matter with his supervisors.39 Additionally, Mr.
31 Id at *4.
32 Diggins, 2009 WL 3461616, at *4-5. Ultimately, Mr. Giovanni stated "that he was

satisfied with the trial court's charge to the jury." Id at *5.
34 Id at 1.
35 Id at *1, 8. Diggins also based his claim on the fact that Mr. Giovanni did not file a
notice of appeal, which, during his testimony, Mr. Giovanni described as an "oversight."
Diggins, 2009 WL 3461616, at *1, 7. However, the court rejected this argument, holding
that the failure to file a notice of appeal "does not provide a basis for relief' in a motion
pursuant to section 440.1 0(1)(h) of the New York Criminal Procedure Law. Id. at * 16.
36 Id at *7-8.

31 Id. at *7.
38 Id

Diggins, 2009 WL 3461616, at *3, 7.
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Giovanni testified that he and Diggins had strategized a defense;
however, without Diggins's presence at the trial, the defense would
not have been effective. 40 Because the case involved a domestic
violence dispute and the gun had been recovered, Mr. Giovanni
"believed that without [the] defendant present to provide insight into
the witnesses [sic] testimony, biases, background, ability to see and
perceive the events and other information for cross-examination, it
was virtually impossible for him to wage a vigorous defense." 4 ' He
stated that "his intent was to do his best for his client[;] [h]owever,
faced with a powerful case and no client to assist him, [he] made a
conscious and considered decision not to participate." 4 2
In denying Diggins's motion, the court based its decision on
the fact that Mr. Giovanni "did not completely fail to participate" in
the hearing and trial, "nor did he ever claim that he was unprepared
or inexperienced." 43 Furthermore, the court reasoned that the
defendant's action of absenting himself from the hearing and trial
made it particularly difficult for Mr. Giovanni to present a successful
Under the circumstances, Mr. Giovanni "made a
defense."
conscious, strategic decision not to participate in the Huntley hearing
and the trial in absentia." 4 5 The court was concerned with the
consequences that would arise if a defendant was able to " 'forestall
Id. at *7.
Id. at *8. Mr. Giovanni stated that " 'the chances of getting an acquittal of an empty
chair [in a] domestic violence trial were very, very low and that the less said the better
actually.' " Id. (internal citations omitted). He also stated "that he felt that attacking [Mrs.
Diggins'] credibility would only serve to accentuate the negative inferences the jury would
make regarding [Diggins'] absence." Id. at *7. His assessment of the case was "based on
his experience and the discussions he had about the case with his supervisors." Diggins,
2009 WL 3461616, at *7.
42 Id. at *8. Mr. Giovanni "was aware throughout the trial that if only one juror had voted
not to convict there would have been a hung jury and the defendant might have been picked
up in time for a retrial." Id.
43 Id. at *11-12, 16. Specifically, Mr. Giovanni participated in the following ways:
He repeatedly objected to the trial going forward in absentia, requested
an instruction to the prospective jurors about his plan not to participate,
requested the instruction be repeated in the court's final charge to the
jury, indicated approval of the court's final charge to the jury and the
court's proposed answer to a jury note, and had the jury polled after the
verdict was rendered.
Id. at *12.
' Diggins, 2009 WL 3461616, at *10, 12.
45 Id. at *13 (emphasis omitted) ("[T]he wisdom of Mr. Giovanni's decision does not
constitute grounds for finding ineffective assistance . . . .").
40

41
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adjudication indefinitely by intentionally sabotaging his own
defense.' "46 " 'To reward such tactics would defy both the purposes
of the Sixth [A]mendment and common sense.' "47 The court also
noted that the evidence against Diggins was compelling and he "ha[d]
not demonstrated that 'but for' the attorney's omissions, the outcome
of the trial would have been any different." 4 8 Moreover, Diggins did
not identify an objection that should have been made, a juror Mr.
Giovanni should have challenged, or a witness that should have been
called to testify. 49 Essentially, Diggins failed to meet his burden of
proof.so
An individual's right to the effective assistance of counsel is
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.s" The purpose of the Counsel Clause of the Sixth
Amendment is to ensure that every criminal defendant receives a fair
trial.5 2 The right to counsel has been defined by the Court as " 'the
right to the effective assistance of counsel.' " A denial of this right
can occur "simply by failing to render 'adequate legal assistance.' ,54
In Strickland v. Washington, 5 the Supreme Court set forth the
standard for determining whether an individual's Sixth Amendment
right to the effective assistance of counsel has been violated. 56 Under
this standard, a defendant must demonstrate two elements of
ineffective assistance in order to reverse a conviction. 5
First, the

defendant

must show that

counsel's

Id. at *12 ("[D]efendant 'may not by his absence effectively force his attorney into a
strategy of silence and then complain that he was denied counsel . . . .. .. (quoting United
States v. Sanchez, 790 F.2d 245, 254 (2d Cir. 1986))).
47 Id. (quoting Sanchez, 790 F.2d at 254).
48 Id. at *12-13.
49 Diggins, 2009 WL 3461616, at *14.
50 Id. at * 16. "At a hearing on a motion to vacate judgment, 'the defendant has the burden
of proving by a preponderance of the evidence every fact essential to support the motion.'
Id. at *14 (quoting N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.30(6) (McKinney 2010)).
5' See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
52 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-85 (1984) ("[T]he Sixth Amendment right
to counsel exists, and is needed, in order to protect the fundamental right to a fair trial.").
5 Id. at 686 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970)).
54 Id (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 345 (1980)).
SId. at 668.
56 See id. at 671, 684, 687.
5 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 ("Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be
said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary
process....").
46
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performance was deficient. This requires showing that
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant
by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must
show that the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors
were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair
trial, a trial whose result is reliable.18
In analyzing counsel's performance, the court must be
convinced that the representation the defendant received "fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness."5 9 When making this
evaluation, "a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that,
under the circumstances, the challenged action 'might be considered
sound trial strategy.' "60 Notably, the reviewing court may be
strongly persuaded by the defendant's conduct when making a
determination of counsel's reasonableness. 6 '
In analyzing the prejudice component, the court will not
overturn a conviction where the error by counsel would not have
altered the outcome of the defendant's trial.6 2 Although in certain
circumstances prejudice is presumed, "actual ineffectiveness claims
alleging a deficiency in attorney performance are subject to a general
requirement that the defendant must affirmatively prove prejudice." 63
58 id

' Id. at 687-88. In other words, "a court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must
judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case,
viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct." Id. at 690. The Court further noted that "[t]he
proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms." Id. at 688.
60 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (quoting Michael v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).
61 Id. at 691 ("The reasonableness of counsel's conduct may be determined or
substantially influenced by the defendant's own statements or actions."). "As Strickland
makes clear, whether an attorney's representation was reasonable or not must be based on a
consideration of all the circumstances, including the actions and statements of the
defendant." People v. Diggins, No. 4637/03, 2009 WL 3461616, at *9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct.
19, 2009).
62 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 ("An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable,
does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no
effect on the judgment.").
63 Id at 692-93 (noting that "[a]ctual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel,"
state interference with the assistance of counsel, and actual conflicts of interest are presumed
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Therefore, in most cases, "[t]he defendant must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different.""
In United States v. Sanchez,65 the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the defendant's right to the effective assistance of
counsel under the Sixth Amendment was not violated when his
attorney failed to "make opening or closing statements or objections
to the admission of evidence or to cross-examine witnesses" during
trial.66 Following Sanchez's failure to appear for his trial for drug
related crimes, the district court, over counsel's objections, ordered
that the trial proceed in absentia.67 Other than moving for an
acquittal and objecting to the jury instructions relating to Sanchez's
absence, Sanchez's attorney remained silent during the trial.68
In applying the performance prong of the Strickland standard,
the court acknowledged that "[iun some cases, a strategy of silence on
defense counsel's part may be quite appropriate. ,,69 Where an
uncooperative and unavailable client "precludes any reasonable basis
for an active defense, the strategy of silence-perhaps in hopes that
the government will produce insufficient evidence or that the
government or court will commit reversible error-may actually
constitute a defense strategy." 70 In evaluating the reasonableness of
counsel's conduct, the reviewing court must be aware that
[T]he right to counsel does not impose upon a defense
attorney a duty unilaterally to investigate and find
evidence, or to pursue a fishing expedition by crossexamination, or to present opening or closing remarks
on the basis of no helpful information, or to object
without purpose, on behalf of an uncooperative and
unavailable client.

to be prejudicial to the defendant's case).
6 Id. at 694.
6s 790 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1986).
66 Id at 247.
67 Id. at 247-48.
61 Id. at 248.
69 Id. at 253 (citing Warner v. Ford, 752 F.2d 622, 625 (11th Cir. 1985)).
70 Sanchez, 790 F.2d at 253. (noting that Sanchez did not attempt to
communicate,
cooperate, or consult with his counsel).
1 Id.
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The court also found, as did the court in Diggins, that the defense
attorney did not completely fail to participate in the trial.72
Moreover, Sanchez failed to establish the prejudice component of the
Strickland standard.73 Because the evidence presented during trial
was "overwhelming evidence of Sanchez' guilt," the court was not
convinced that counsel's participation would have changed the
outcome of the trial.7 4
In Warner v. Ford,7 5 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
was presented with the issue of whether defense counsel's
"inactivity" violated the defendant's right to the effective assistance
of counsel under the Sixth Amendment.7 6 Warner claimed that his
Sixth Amendment right was violated when his attorney "played an
inactive role" at his trial for theft and a weapons violation.77 This
inactivity consisted of his attorney's failure to participate in voir dire
and make peremptory challenges, pretrial motions, and an opening
statement. 7 8 Furthermore, Warner's counsel did not question on
cross-examination, object to evidence presented against Warner,
present character evidence, or make a closing argument. 79 He also
failed to request jury instructions or that the jury be polled."
However, Warner's counsel participated minimally by moving for a
directed verdict, moving for a mistrial numerous times, giving legal
advice to Warner, questioning a juror, and presenting an argument
during sentencing.'
The court rejected Warner's claim that he was denied the
effective assistance of counsel.82 The actions of Warner's attorney
during trial "were based on trial strategy."83 "Silence can constitute
Id. (stating that Sanchez's attorney participated by "objecting to the trial in absentiaand
to the flight instruction and by moving for a judgment of acquittal").
7 Id at 253-54 (stating that Sanchez "ha[d] not demonstrated a 'reasonable probability'
that but for [his attorney's] silence Sanchez would not have been convicted").
74 Id. at 254.
" 752 F.2d 622 (11th Cir. 1985).
76 Id. at 624.
" Id. at 623-24.
78 Id at 623.
72

79

d.

s0 Warner, 752 F.2d at 623-24.
8

Id. at 624.

82

Id. at 623.

83 Id at 624 (noting that defendant's attorney "testified ... that his silence reflected a trial

strategy in the face of overwhelming evidence against his client").
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trial strategy" and "[w]hether that strategy is so defective as to . . .
establish ineffective assistance of counsel must be judged on a caseby-case basis."8 4 The court applied the Strickland standard to the
attorney's strategy of silence and found that the "silent trial tactic was
reasonable under the circumstances." 85 In making this determination,
the court focused on the fact that Warner's attorney was prepared for
the trial, had discussed his "silent strategy" with his client during the
trial, and had successfully used the "silent strategy" in previous
cases. 86 Furthermore, the prosecutor testified as to counsel's
competence as a criminal defense attorney.8 7 Counsel's decisions
were based, in part, on Warner's criminal record and the compelling
evidence against Warner.88 Under the circumstances, counsel's
"silent strategy" was reasonable and did not "entitle Warner to
constitutional relief."89
Warner also failed to prove the prejudice prong of the
Strickland standard. 90 Not only did Warner neglect to identify any
specific conduct in which his attorney should have engaged during
his trial, but the evidence against him was overwhelming. 9'
Distinguishable from Sanchez and Warner is the case of
Martin v. Rose, 92 where the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the defendant's constitutional right to the effective assistance of
counsel was violated when his attorney decided to "stand mute"
during trial. 93 Martin was convicted of, among other things, criminal
sexual conduct and incest after an alleged incident with his
stepdaughters. 94 After his motion for a continuance was denied,

'

85

Id. at 625.
Warner, 752 F.2d at 625.

86 Id

id
id
89 Id. ("[V]irtual silence may well have been the best trial strategy available for the
obviously guilty Warner.").
90 Warner, 752 F.2d at 625-26 ("[T]here is no reasonable probability that Warner would
have been acquitted or received less than a fifteen-year sentence.").
91 Id. Specifically, Warner did not identify an alternative defense that should have been
presented, any question that should have been posed, or any witness that should have been
called to testify. Id. at 626. Warner "admitted he could think of nothing his counsel should
have done." Id.
92 744 F.2d 1245 (6th Cir. 1984).
9 Id. at 1248-49, 1252.
Id. at 1247.
87
88
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which was filed because he was not prepared to try the case, Martin's
counsel informed the court of his decision not to participate during
the trial.9 5 During the trial, Martin's counsel did not participate in the
jury selection process, cross-examine or call any witnesses, make any
objections, make a closing statement, or object to the jury charge. 96
In deciding Martin's claim, the court acknowledged that counsel's
failure to participate was a trial tactic.97 However, "even deliberate
trial tactics may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if they
fall 'outside the wide range of professionally competent
assistance.' "98 The strategy utilized by Martin's counsel was neither
reasonable nor logical under the facts presented in this case. 99
Rather, it was "an unreasonable tactic since the attorney was aware of
a strong defense that he could present without compromising his
earlier motions."' 00 The court's reasoning focused on the fact that
Martin denied all charges, was available to provide testimony at trial,
0
Because there were other
and had no prior criminal history.o'
the decision of Martin's
pursue,
to
strategies
defense
available
attorney to remain inactive during the trial cannot be considered an
" 'exercise of reasonable professional judgment.' "102 Accordingly,
Martin was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.'o3
The New York Constitution also guarantees the right to the

9 Id. Specifically, "Martin's counsel stated, 'We do wish to rely on our Motions, and I
don't want to be disrespectful to the Court, but in going to trial today, the defendant won't
put on any proof, and I won't cross-examine or participate in the trial.' " Id. Furthermore,
"Martin's counsel testified that he had refused to participate in the trial because he was not
ready." Martin, 744 F.2d at 1248.
96

Id at 1247.

97 Id. at 1249 ("Unquestionably, the attorney's failure to participate was a deliberate trial
tactic . . . ").
98 Id. (quoting Strickland,466 U.S. at 690).
9 Id. ("The decision by Martin's attorney not to participate cannot be considered 'sound
trial strategy' or 'professionally competent assistance.'
" Martin, 744 F.2d at 1250.
1o1 Id. The court also stated that "[tihe only direct evidence against Martin was the
testimony of his stepdaughters." Id. If Martin was called to testify, the jury would have
heard his denial as well as his theory behind the accusations of his stepdaughters. Id. The
jury would then have been able to make a determination regarding his credibility. Id. The
court noted that this defense "would have required no further preparation." Martin, 744 F.2d
at 1250.
102 Id at 1250 (quoting Strickland,466 U.S. at 690).
103 Id. at 1252.
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effective assistance of counsel.10 4 However, "[a] more flexible
standard is applied to determine whether [a] defendant has been
denied [this] right . . . under Article I

§6

of the New York State

05

Constitution."
In setting forth the standard to be utilized in claims of
ineffective assistance under the New York Constitution, the New
York Court of Appeals, in People v. Baldi,106 sought to "avoid both
confusing true ineffectiveness with mere losing tactics and according
undue significance to retrospective analysis."' 7 Emphasizing that
"trial tactics which terminate unsuccessfully do not automatically
indicate ineffectiveness," the court declared that "[s]o long as the
evidence, the law, and the circumstances of a particular case, viewed
in totality and as of the time of the representation, reveal that the
attorney provided meaningful representation, the constitutional
requirement will have been met."'08 In determining claims under the
meaningful representation standard, the reviewing court should not
criticize counsel's strategy by suggesting a potentially more
successful defense.109 Rather, "[c]ounsel's performance should be
'objectively evaluated' to determine whether it was consistent with
strategic decisions of a 'reasonably competent attorney.' "Io The
right to counsel is not violated where defense counsel's performance,
though unsuccessful, "reflects a reasonable and legitimate strategy
under the circumstances and evidence presented."'
The meaningful representation standard set forth in Baldi
differs from Strickland's two-component standard." 2

104

See N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.

105 People v. Diggins, No. 4637/03, 2009 WL 3461616, at *9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 19,

2009) (citing People v. Benevento, 697 N.E.2d 584, 587 (N.Y. 1998)).
106 429 N.E.2d 400 (N.Y.
1981).
107Id at 405.
108 Id. (emphasis added) (citing People v. Jackson, 420 N.E.2d 97, 98 (N.Y. 1981)). Put
more simply, "[tihe core inquiry is whether the defendant has received 'meaningful
representation.' " Diggins, 2009 WL 3461616, at *9 (citing Baldi, 429 N.E.2d at 405).
" Benevento, 697 N.E.2d at 587 ("[C]ounsel's efforts should not be second-guessed with
the clarity of hindsight to determine how the defense might have been more effective."
(citing People v. Satterfield, 488 N.E.2d 834, 836-37 (N.Y. 1985))).
110Id. at 587 (quoting People v. Angelakos, 512 N.E.2d 305, 307 (N.Y. 1987)).
"t

Id

Diggins, 2009 WL 3461616, at *9. Though dissimilar, the second circuit has held that
the "New York state standard for ineffective assistance of counsel is not contrary to
Strickland." Rosario v. Ercole, 601 F.3d 118, 126 (2d Cir. 2010).
112
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Unlike the federal standard, New York Courts do not
require a showing that a reasonable probability exists
that the result of the proceeding would have been
different, but instead adopt a more favorable rule that
while prejudice to the defendant is a significant factor
in the meaningful representation analysis, it is not an
"indispensible element."' 13
By not requiring a demonstration of prejudicial effect on the
outcome, New York law focuses on "whether the error affected the
'fairness of the process as a whole.' "ll14 Because of the omission of
the prejudice requirement, the New York standard is considered to be
the more flexible of the two."'
The New York Court of Appeals has also dealt with the
specific situation of an absent defendant in the case of People v.
Aiken.116 In Aiken, the court of appeals dealt with the issue of
"whether [Warren Aiken], who voluntarily and willfully absented
himself from trial, was denied the right to [the] effective assistance of
counsel.""' Aiken claimed that his right was violated because his
attorney failed to make opening and closing statements, call or crossexamine any witnesses, and object to the introduction of certain
evidence." 8 In determining that Aiken was not denied the right to
the effective assistance of counsel, the court emphasized that his
absence from the trial was strongly considered." 9 "[A] defendant's
absence from trial may severely hamper even the most diligent
counsel's ability to represent his client effectively."' 20 Therefore, "a
defendant who absents himself from trial may not succeed on appeal
113 Diggins, 2009 WL 3461616, at *9 (citing People v. Stultz, 810 N.E.2d 883, 887 (N.Y.
2004)).
114 Rosario,601 F.3d at 124 (quoting Benevento, 697 N.E.2d at 588).
" Diggins, 2009 WL 3461616, at *9; People v. Turner, 840 N.E.2d 123, 125-26 (N.Y.
2005) (stating that New York "ineffective assistance cases have departed from the second
('but for') prong of Strickland, adopting a rule somewhat more favorable to defendants"
(citing People v. Caban, 833 N.E.2d 213, 222 (N.Y. 2005))).
116 People v. Aiken, 380 N.E.2d 272, 273 (N.Y. 1978). Though decided prior to Baldi,
Aiken sets forth important principles regarding the impact of a defendant's absence on an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See id at 275.

"1Id.at 273.

11 Id. at 274.
1 Id. at 275 (stating that a defendant's absence "must, of necessity, be taken into
consideration on the issue of counsel's effectiveness").
120 Aiken, 380 N.E.2d at
275.
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by raising counsel's purported ineffectiveness where counsel
affirmatively, as a matter of trial strategy, sought to obstruct the trial

of his client."l21
In People v. Verdel,12 2 the appellate division held that the
defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel was not violated at
a suppression hearing.' 2 3 At the hearing, the defendant's counsel
requested an adjournment to afford him more time to review material
he received from the prosecution.124 The trial court denied this
request.12 5 As a result, "counsel refused to cross-examine the
People's witness, or to make any arguments for suppression."l26
Finding that this conduct was a "strategic decision, seeking to create
delay or establish an appellate issue," the court rejected the

defendant's claim.127
Id. (finding that "counsel's conduct [is] indicative of a conscious strategic decision
designed to pressure the trial court into declaring a mistrial").
122 804 N.Y.S.2d 294 (App. Div. 1st Dep't
2005).
121

123 Id. at 296.
124

Id at 295-96.

125 id
126

Id at 296.

Verdel, 804 N.Y.S.2d at 296. There are many New York cases where the court has
denied a defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the New York
Constitution, despite the fact that counsel failed to participate in some way. See, e.g., People
v. Fleming, 2010 WL 3155308, at *1 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't Aug. 10, 2010) ("[C]ontrary
to the defendant's contention, defense counsel's failure to object to the admission of certain
evidence or certain remarks made by the prosecutor during summation, or to request
127

unidentified procedural safeguards .

.

. , did not constitute ineffective assistance of

counsel."); People v. Daniels, 891 N.Y.S.2d 815, 816 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 2009) ("There is
no merit to the . .. contention of defendant that he received ineffective assistance of counsel
based on defense counsel's failure to object to the admission of the evidence at the
suppression hearing."); People v. Lacey, 887 N.Y.S.2d 158, 161 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2009)
("[C]ounsel's strategy not to call a witness at the hearing ... does not amount to ineffective
assistance of counsel."). However, the New York courts have held that certain egregious
failures and omissions on the part of counsel cannot be considered sound trial tactics.
Rather, in these situations, the courts have found these errors to be completely unreasonable
thereby violating the defendant's right to the effective assistance of counsel. See, e.g.,
People v. Trait, 527 N.Y.S.2d 920, 921 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1988) (finding ineffective
assistance where, among other things, "[c]ounsel's trial preparation was inadequate to the
extent that his direct and cross-examination of witnesses was rendered largely ineffective");
People v. Wagner, 479 N.Y.S.2d 66, 67-69 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1984) (finding ineffective
assistance where "there were so many errors;" in particular, counsel "displayed a
forgetfulness of basic principles of criminal law and procedure" and failed to request a
pretrial hearing, challenge prospective jurors, and object to inadmissible evidence); People v.
Riley, 475 N.Y.S.2d 691, 692 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1984) ("[C]ounsel demonstrated an
obvious lack of pretrial preparation and a marked unfamiliarity with the earlier proceedings .
. . ."); People v. Angellilo, 457 N.Y.S.2d 118, 119 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1982) (stating that
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Though the standards for measuring the effectiveness of
counsel are different, both the Federal and State Constitutions
guarantee this essential right. Under both standards, Mr. Giovanni's
conduct clearly fell within the "wide range of reasonable professional
assistance." 28 His conduct reflected a "reasonable and legitimate
trial strategy under the circumstances" with which he was
presented.1 29 In deciding ineffectiveness claims, courts give great
weight to a defendant's conduct during trial, especially when the
defendant fails to be present for his trial.130 This is because a
defendant's absence from trial can significantly affect how counsel
will proceed at trial.13' Because of Diggins's absence, Mr. Giovanni
could not present a reasonable alternative defense that would have
been successful.1 32 Without Diggins present to assist him during the
trial, Mr. Giovanni was restricted to the "strategy of silence." 33 In
determining that Mr. Giovanni's strategy was reasonable, the court
focused on factors such as Mr. Giovanni's experience and
preparedness, the fact that Mr. Giovanni did not completely fail to
participate, and the compelling evidence against Diggins. 134 The
outcome in Diggins might have been different if Diggins was present
at trial and Mr. Giovanni's strategic decisions were not altered. This
reasoning is based on the fact that Mr. Giovanni could have presented
a reasonable alternative defense if Diggins attended the hearing and
trial.
When considering the experience and preparedness of an
attorney, courts look to see how long the attorney has been practicing
in the area of criminal law, if the attorney has ever used the "silent

"the record persuasively demonstrates that counsel was so completely unprepared and
unfamiliar with either the facts or the law bearing on defendant's case").
128 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984).
129 See People v. Diggins, No. 4637/03, 2009 WL 3461616, at *9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 19,
2009).
130Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. See, e.g., Sanchez, 790 F.2d at 254.
131 Diggins, 2009 WL 3461616, at *10.
132 Compare id at *7-8 (holding that defendant's right to the effective assistance of
counsel was not violated where counsel testified that it would have been difficult to present
an alternative defense), with Martin v. Rose, 744 F.2d 1245, 1250 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding
that defendant's right to the effective assistance of counsel was violated when his attorney
"was aware of a strong defense that he could present").
" Diggins, 2009 WL 3461616, at *7-8 (noting that Mr. Giovanni testified that any other
defense strategy would have proved futile).
134 Id. at * 12-13.
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strategy" in prior matters, and whether the attorney has prepared for
the hearing or trial in the matter before it. If an attorney appears to be
using the "silent strategy" due to a lack of experience, a court will
most likely use this to the defendant's benefit. Similarly, if an
attorney fails to participate in a trial or hearing merely because he is
not prepared to defend his client, a court will find that the use of the
"silent strategy" in this situation is unacceptable, especially where the
attorney had ample time to prepare a defense. However, if the
attorney has extensive experience in criminal matters and has used
the "silent strategy" successfully, a court will find that the attorney's
decision was that of a "reasonably competent attorney" who made a
"conscious, strategic decision."
Moreover, a court will strongly consider the fact that an
attorney participates in some aspects of the trial rather than remaining
silent the entire time. When an attorney uses the silent strategy but
participates to a limited extent, it shows that the attorney is in fact
making a tactical decision to remain silent and, at the same time, is
looking out for the best interests of his client by participating where
appropriate. On the other hand, if an attorney did not participate
where it was appropriate and, instead, remained silent for the entire
trial, a court would most likely find this unreasonable and deem this
conduct a violation of the defendant's constitutional right.
Additionally, a court will consider the weight of the evidence
against a defendant on trial. If the prosecution has a strong case
against the defendant and it appears that the defendant will not
prevail, the defendant's attorney may not have any other reasonable
choice but to remain silent. This is especially true where an active
defense, as opposed to a silent defense, would not add anything of
significance or, more importantly, would harm the defense's case.
In evaluating the reasonableness of counsel's conduct, both
the federal and New York courts seem to focus on the same abovementioned factors. A difference in the federal and state standards
arises, however, when determining whether counsel's conduct
prejudiced the outcome of the defendant's trial. Under the federal
standard, the reviewing court must determine that counsel's conduct
was prejudicial to the outcome of the trial before finding that the
defendant's right to the effective assistance of counsel was violated.
Under the New York standard, prejudice to the outcome of the
defendant's trial is not determinative; rather, it is a factor to be
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considered in the overall evaluation of counsel's conduct and the
fairness of the proceeding.
Because this issue is decided on a case-by-case basis and is
very fact specific, it may be difficult to determine at what point
counsel's assistance would be rendered ineffective. However, it is
important that counsel be aware of the aforementioned factors that
courts consider when evaluating the reasonableness of an attorney's
conduct.
Laura R. Bugdin'

* Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2012, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center.
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